Abstract-The Unified Modeling Language UML 2.0 plays a central role in modern software engineering, and it is considered as the de facto standard for modeling software architectures and designs. Todays systems are becoming more and more complex, and very difficult to deal with. The main difficulty arises from the different ways in modelling each component and the way they interact with each others. At this level of software modeling, providing methods and tools that allow early detection of errors is mandatory.
I. INTRODUCTION
A major challenge in the software development process is to advance error detection to early phases of the software life-cycle. For this purpose, the verification of UML diagrams plays an important role in detecting flaws at the design level. It has a distinct importance for software security, since it is crucial to detect security flaws before they have been exploited. From the literature, a lot of techniques have been proposed for verification of softwares as well as hardwares like: Model Checking, Theorem Proving, and Static Analysis, etc. The most of the techniques used for verification of UML diagrams is model checking. Model checking is an important technology of automatic verification. It verifies the properties against a model through explicit state exploration, and elegantly presents the counter example paths when the system does not satisfy a property. The most important researches focusing on model checking of UML models verify the properties specified by a formal language after extracting the semantic model of UML design, and then they translate it into the input languages of the existing model checkers.
Most of the approaches proposed in the literature are intended either to activity, state machine [1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 14] , or sequence diagrams [1, 13] separatly. We experience in industrial collaborations, that in practice most UML behavioural diagrams are mixed and connected. Effectively, in the literature there is a poor prior approachs that proposes a solution for this case when UML behavioural diagrams interacts.
The main intent of our work is to focus on the verification of UML design models containing different connected UML behavioral models. We will focus on security properties like authentication. For that we have chosen the model checking technique because it's automatic, and characterized by features like model reduction. To construct the semantic model of different UML behavioural diagrams, we defined a new compositional operator to fully automate the semantic model generation of the interacted UML models. The security properties are specified by a simple instantiation from security templates describing a set of applicationindependent properties to produce a set of applicationdependent properties proper to the application [5] .
As a case study, we apply the proposed technique to verify the message authentication security property on Automated Teller Machine (ATM). ATM is written as an UML-based model composed of two different UML behavioural diagrams:a state machine describing client authentication and an activity diagram describing transaction operation. The ATM security properties were obtained from the authentication templates, and formalized by the formal language : the Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [2] . The result of this case study shows how to verify a complex system described by a mixed UML behavioural diagram.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II. presents the related work. Section III. explores UML behavioral diagrams (BDs) and their possible interactions inside a UML design. We define and generate the semantic model for the global UML design in the form of transition system in Section IV. . The proposed verification approach is detailed in Section V. . In Section VI. , we provide a ATM case study. Finally, we conclude the paper by a conclusion and a promising future work in Section VII. .
II. RELATED WORK
In the state of the art, there is a considerable number of researches which are intended to verify just one kind of UML behavioural bediagrams like a state machine or a sequence diagram without taking in consideration their interactions when a state machine call an activity diagram for example.
Cheng et al. [5] investigate how the verification of security properties can be enabled by adding formal constraints to UML-based security patterns. From the proposed templates, they instantiate the security properties to enable their analysis by using the Spin model checker. The limit of their work is in how to tailor a security pattern to meet the needs of a system especially when it contains a set of connected diagrams.
A Static Verification Framework (SVF) is developped in [14] to support the design and verification of secure peer-to-peer applications. The framework supports the specification, modeling, and analysis of security properties together with the behavior of the system. The SVF developped in [12] is the continuation work of Andrea [14] , they translate the UML state machine including guards into Promela models that are amenable for Spin model checking with LTL properties. Their works are limited to only the state machine diagram that describe a peer-to-peer applications, also their properties represents just a proposed scenarios for the attacker.
Beato et al. [3] developed a complete automatic tool called TABU to transform active and state machine diagrams into an SMV (Symbolic Model Verifier) specification via Labeled Transition Systems (LTS). The properties are specified by the pattern classification proposed by Dwyer et al [7] . In their work, they didn't consider when a state machines are composed with activity diagrams.
Eshuis et al. describe in [8] a tool that verify UML activity diagrams by specifying the activity diagrams as a Clocked Transition Systems then generate automatically the NuSMV input code. The limits of their approach resides when they ignore the verification of some cases by stopping the computation of the transition system if one of the nodes becomes unbounded, and more than that, they focuse only on activity diagram. Giese et al. provide in [9] a domain specific formal semantic definition to verify a real-time UML design and an integrated sequence of design steps by prescribing how to compose complex software systems from domain-specific patterns. The composition of these patterns to describe the complete component behaviour is prescribed by a syntactic definition which guarantees the verification of components and system behaviour can exploit the results of the verification of individual patterns. Amstel et al. [13] propose trace analysis techniques by using model checkers to improve the quality of sequence diagrams, and to get PROMELA code from sequence diagrams. This technique provides a translation scheme that is defined in [11] . These works are limited to just one kind of real-time diagram as well as sequence diagram. Dong et al. in [6] , define a set of rules to verify UML Dynamic Models. These rules are based on hierarchical automata between semantics structures, and simulation relation to reduce the detailed components to an abstracted specifications. In their work, they gave the results without linking their simple case study to the theory proposed. More than that, they didn't mention the effect of the simulation relation in a model which is the main step in verification.
In [1] , a framework has been proposed for verifying UML diagrams, the extracted semantics model is called Configuration Transition System (CTS), a kind of Transition System. The resulting CTS is translated into NuSMV [10] code. This approach allows verfication behavioral against properties written in CTL, and our work is the continuation of [1] .
The verification in [1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14] is done by using different semantic models, and using different checking techniques. None of them addressed the problem of linking several UML Behavioural Diagrams.
III. SYNTAX OF UML BEHAVIORAL DIAGRAMS
UML supports behavioral modeling, but more than that it supports the interaction between behavioral models. Figure 1 shows the different UML behavioral models. In this section, we explore all the possible interactions between UML behavioral diagrams to complete the systax defined in [1] .
A. State Machines (SM)
In UML, we have two kinds of State Machines (SM): behavioral state machines and protocol state machines. The role of these two diagrams is to express the behavior of the system, and the usage protocol of part of that system, respectively. A SM can have association with a BD in its state as in its transition:
• State: It models a situation where some invariant condition holds. A state can have one association with a BD in three places:
1. doActivity, a BD is executed while being in the state. The execution starts when this state is entered, and stops either by itself or when the state is exited whichever comes first.
2.
Entry, a BD is executed whenever the state is entered regardless of the transition taken to reach the state. If defined, entry actions Figure 1 : all the possible interactions between UML behavioral diagrams.
are always executed to completion prior to any internal behavior or transitions performed within the state.
3.
Exit, a BD is executed whenever this state is exited regardless of which transition was taken out of the state. If defined, exit actions are always executed to completion only after all internal activities and transition actions have completed execution.
• Transition: It is a directed relationship between a source vertex and a target vertex in a state machine. During the activation of this transition, the behavioral diagram specified in association with Effect can be executed.
B. Activity Diagram (AD)
An activity diagram includes concurrent control, data flow, and decisions. It supports structured activities (sequences, loops, and conditions), but it can have just one association with another behavior at time for each of the following activity elements:
• DecisionNode: It is a control node that chooses between outgoing flows. It has an association in decisionInput to provide input to guard specifications on edges outgoing from the decision node.
• ObjectFlow: It is an activity edge to model the flow of values to/or from object nodes that can have objects or data passing along them. It can have two associations with a BD in Selection object to select tokens from a source object node, and in Transformation object to change or replace data tokens flowing along edge.
• ObjectNode: It's an abstract activity node that contains only values at runtime that conform to the type of the object node. It has an association with a BD in Selection to select tokens for outgoing edges.
C. Interaction Diagram(ID)
Interactions are a mechanism for describing systems that can be understood and produced by providing different capabilities that makes it more appropriate for certain situations (i. For the remainder of this paper we note S elmt as the set of elements where the BDs can be connected.
IV. SEMANTIC OF UML BEHAVIORAL DIAGRAMS

A. Configuration Transition System
A Configuration Transition System (CTS) [1] is a formal description of the behavior of a system. A CTS is considered as a directed graph where nodes represent configurations, and edges model transitions. A Configuration is a specific binding of a set of values to the set of variables in the dynamic domain of the behavior of a system. i.e, the set of value assigned to the variables of the system during one step of execution (e.g., the evaluation of variables in an iteration of a program). A Transition specifies how the system can change from one configuration to another i.e, the relation between the current configuration and next ones. Definition 1 [1] gives the formal definition of a CTS.
Definition 1 (Configuration Transition System).
A Configuration Transition System CTS is a tuple (C, Act, →, I, E) where:
• C is a set of configurations, • Act is a set of actions,
Large systems are built from smaller parts, so we have to reason about their components, and how they interacts. Semantically, a component Π i of a system is represented by CT S i and the parallel composition of the system Π 1 . . . Π n is represented by the composition of CTSs components CT S 1 • . . .
• CT S n . In our case, the composition is defined as a simple substitution (Definition 2), we substitute the transition relation that represents an element of S elmt (called interface) by its corresponding CTS.
Definition
The composition (CT S i • CT S j ) of CT S i , and CT S j is the substitution of CT S j in the specific transition that represents the interface → r (c i1 , act i , c i2 ) of CT S i defined by the tuple: CT S = (S, Act, →, I, E), where:
In order to ensure the scalability of the verification process for systems composed as Definition 1 we have derived Theorem 1. The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. The composition of CTS's is associative, i.e.: (CT
More than that, we conclude from Definition 2 the maximum number of possibilties to apply the compositional operation in the initial CT S 1 . This maximum is bounded by the number of interfaces and its up to the number of transitions (n). Also, we can observe that this composition is not commutative, and not transitive.
B. Generation of Configuration Transition System
To capture the semantic model of a single BD having no interaction with other BDs, we have to generate its proper CTS where each configuration represents the active elements in that diagram, and the transition represent the transition from source configuration to the target configuration. To achieve that, we iterate the breadth-first search procedure as presented in Algorithm 1 which is the simplified version of the one presented in [1] . In each iteration, the new configuration explored from the current configuration denoted by CurrentConf and the trace of configurations are saved in FoundConfList list where CTSTransList list contains the transitions between configurations. The unexplored configurations are in CTSConfList list, and EventList lists the possible incoming events. Initially, still they are a discovered configurations to explore in FoundConfList, the top element is loaded into CurrentConf and add it into result list of configuration if it's not added in CTSConfList. Given the current configuration CurrentConf and the event list EventList, the trace of configuration FoundConfList is updated. While this trace is not empty the configuration transition list CTSTransList will be updated. To generate the CTS of a UML diagram interconnected with other BDs by association presented in section 2, and noted by → r in definition 2 we propose the recursive algorithm Algorithm 2 derived from Algorithm 1. The algorithm calls itself when a transition contains an interface. However, we avoid to recalculate the CTSs that have been already generated so far.
V. VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY
Our contribution is an automatic model checking based approach as depicted in Figure 2 . The approach consists of two parts: the verification part where we construct the global semantic model of our design model, and the second one is the Specification part where we express a set of security properties to be verified for our model. At the beginning of the verification part, we have a set of separated UML behavioral diagrams, for this reason we have to extract their corresponding semantic models (CTS) separately, and based on their interactions in the global model we construct its corresponding CTS by constructing the set of the existing interfaces between the CTSs of the small parts. The formal structure CTS representing the global system to be verified is a composition of a small ones: CT S 1 , . . . , CT S n where CT S = CT S 1 • . . .
• CT S n . Our objectif is to check for a given property (π) if it holds for CT S verifying CT S |= π (i.e. CT S 1 • . . .
• CT S n |= π) involves the exhaustive inspection of CT S instead of the property π. The property we want to verify should be formally specified by a büchi automata, or using a temporal logic to be able to use model checking. Based on Definition 2,and Theorem1 we have derived a corollary to handle the verification of the complex system having n Algorithm 2: The CTS of a composition of diagrams CTS (FoundConfList ,CTSConfList, CTSTransList,EventList:list, d: 
• CT S n be a CTS composed of n-sub-CTS, and π a property, the following expression is always true:
From Corollary 1, we notice that in order to verify a property we don't need to construct the whole semantic model of the system but only a subset. The main advantage of the Corollary 1 is to accelerate and optimize the verification procedure.
The specification part: Our approach is a model checking based, so we have chosen to formalize our security properties by using a temporal language like (LTL, CTL, CTL*) [4] depending on the model checker used. For that, we are using a set of security templates proposed in [5] . Firstly, we extract the applicationindependent security properties from a given templates of security patterns like: Single Access Point, Check Point, Roles, Session, Full View with Errors, Limited View, Authorization, Multi-level Security. Secondly, we instantiate their appropriate application-dependent security properties and formalize them using temporal language of the adopted model checker such as Computational Tree Logic (CTL) for NUSMV 1 model checker [10] As an example of this kind of specification, we picked the template of message authentication presented in Figure 3 as a UML state machine where a countermeasure is taken if an authentication is failed. From this template, we can extract the following security properties, and we express them by a macro language, to be applied in the case study section.
1. An unauthorized access leads eventually to the activation of a countermeasure. The corresponding property expressed in the macro language is the following: Always (UnautorizedAccess imply eventually (CounterMeasureTaken)) 2. When a request was denied, it is important that the current request remains unsuccessful until a new request is received. The corresponding property expressed in the macro language is the following: Always ((UnautorizedAccess imply Request Unseccessful) until NextRequest) 3. When an access is granted, then it should eventually be able to access the system successfully until the next request is received. The corresponding property expressed in the macro language is the following: Always ((AccessGranted imply eventually Operation) until NextRequest)
Using the Graphviz 2 drawing tool, the CTS corresponding to the verified system, as well as the NuSMV assessment results (i.e., the counterexample), will be visualized graphically. A user that requests a service from the ATM has to insert an ATM card and enter a personal identification number (PIN). Both information need to be sent to the bank for validation, if the credentials of the customer are not valid, the card will be ejected out. These tasks of validation and ejecting are presented by an UML state machine diagram with effect (see Section III. ) as described in Figure 4 . Otherwise, the customer will be able to perform one or more transactions where the card stays retained in the machine during the customer interaction until the customer wishes no further service. This part of transaction is described by the activity diagram depicted in Figure 5 .
To assess the composed diagram showed in Figure  4 , we compose its CTS semantic models corresponding to state machine in Figure 6 and activity diagram in Figure 7 with the transition representing the interface of the effect as shown in Figure 8 . From the message authentication template and their associated application- The operators used in the above properties are a mix of logical (!:Not, |:Or, &: And,→: Imply ), and temporal operators (A: All, E: Exists, X: neXt, G: Globaly, F: Figure 7 : The CTS corresponding to the Activity Diagram of Figure 5 .
Finally, U: Until). To take advantage of the Corollary 1, we verify the following property:
So without constructing the whole CTS, just by verifying the property in the CTS of the activity diagram we conclude that the first property is validated for the whole model.
The verification of the above properties are done by the model checker NuSMV version 2.4.3 reveals the validation of the two first properties, and the fourth one. The violation of the third property as showed by the counterexample in Figure 8 . The system diameter(minimum number of iterations of the NuSMV model to obtain all the reachable states) in the verification of each one of the properties is 10, and the number of reachable states is 36 out of 245760 and this is due to cone of influence algorithm implemented from second version of NuSMV and up.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we extended the formal verification from individual UML behavioural diagrams into more complex interactions between state machine, activity, and interaction UML behavioural diagrams. This approach allows verification engineer to detect flaws in the earlier stage of software cycle for more wide and complex systems. In fact this is what happens especially in industry where different diagrams interact together. In addition, our approach gives flexibility to write very expressive properties while hiding temporal operator. This technique, along with other verification tools, can provide a powerful and very useful framework to detect errors at the design phase, resulting in reliable software at the end of the software development process. As a future work, we target two main problems. Firstly, we intend to improve the verification approach in order to deal with more very large and more complex system by splitting the property and distributing sub-properties to the affected parts of the system to the end to achieve a conccurent verification, and develop a formalism proof rules to guaranty the satisfaction of the main property for the whole system. Secondly, The verification of the interacted diagrams must be done without changing their semantic models and verification tools if exists in the separate case in term to produce an optimal verification (cost/size of states). Even in this context, it's very interesting to develop these perspective theory and applications for the industry as acadimia challenges. 
